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ABSTRACT
This paper documents, then analyses two encounters in the late 1980s and
early 1990s between emerging ideas about Aboriginal self-government and
Australian fiscal federalism, the system of intergovernmental financial
transfers in Australia. One of these encounters involves local government
financing and the other State/Territory financing. The paper asks whether
Aboriginal organisations which have pursued ideas of self-government
through these encounters have had a clear view of what they are attempting
to achieve through which federal fiscal mechanisms and how they plan to
achieve it. This question is addressed through a four part analysis focussing
on grants commissions and grant conditions in the universe of Australian
fiscal federalism; on tactics relating to specific purpose payments; on the
lack of vigorous pursuit of an untied general purpose formula-based
funding program for Aboriginal organisations; and on the potential
inconsistency of advocating such a program for Aboriginal organisations
while also advocating that conditions be placed on general purpose funding
to the States and Territories. The paper concludes that there has been some
lack of clarity among Aboriginal organisations pursuing ideas of self
government through Australian fiscal federalism and that some significant
rethinking of their tactics and targets is probably needed.
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Over the last 25 years, under policies of self-determination and self-
management, Australian governments have increasingly funded Aboriginal
community organisations for the delivery of various services to Aboriginal
people and the conduct of Aboriginal community affairs. There are now
several thousand Aboriginal community organisations Australia-wide
which depend for funding on grants not only from the Commonwealth
Aboriginal affairs portfolio but also from a growing number of other
government agencies. Grants are generally subject-specific and made on
the basis of applications from organisations which cover either a particular
project or brief operating period.
This arrangement for the funding of Aboriginal community organisations
has come under increasing attack of recent years. The multiplicity of
government agencies involved has been seen as presenting Aboriginal
organisations with a 'complex and unwieldy environment which is hardly
conducive to effective self-determination and self-management' and as
both wasteful and inefficient (Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 15).
Many Aboriginal organisations would like more simplified and guaranteed
funding arrangements. Some would also like more extensive
responsibilities for the servicing of Aboriginal people and communities,
often through taking over roles presently performed by government
departments. Drawing on the experience of other indigenous minorities
around the world, especially in Canada, some Aboriginal organisations,
particularly in northern and central Australia, have begun to describe the
reforms they desire in funding and jurisdictional responsibilities as
Aboriginal self-government (see Land Rights News August 1993, October
1993, January 1994. See also Crough 1992 and various papers in Fletcher
1994).
This paper attempts to document and analyse some encounters between
these emerging ideas about Aboriginal self-government and Australian
fiscal federalism, the system of intergovernmental financial transfers in
Australia. These encounters began in the 1980s and have intensified during
the 1990s, but from the point of view of the Aboriginal organisations
advocating self-government have, as yet, been largely unfruitful. Funding
arrangements and service responsibilities for Aboriginal organisations have
not yet been significantly changed. Yet the encounters persist and this
apparent lack of progress raises some interesting questions about the tactics
and targets being pursued by Aboriginal organisations interested in self-
government. Do the Aboriginal organisations have a clear view of what it
is they are attempting to achieve, through which federal fiscal mechanisms,
and how they plan to achieve it? Or are they attacking federal fiscal targets
somewhat indiscriminately? These are the questions which this paper
attempts to raise for discussion. It does so first by documenting, then by
analysing, two specific encounters, one involving local government
financing and the other involving State/Territory financing.
Encounter I: local government financing
During the 1970s, when the Commonwealth first became involved in
directly financing local government, it modelled its approach on previous
experience of financing the States. It adopted, in part at least, a general
purpose revenue-sharing approach under which grants were made to local
governments to use for whatever purpose they saw fit, without explicit
conditions being attached. To determine allocations of this revenue sharing
between local governments, the Whitlam Government looked to the
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), which had been advising the
Commonwealth on similar funding allocations between the States since the
1930s. The Fraser Government, as part of its new federalism, encouraged
the States to establish Local Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs) to
advise on intra-state allocations of the funds, while the CGC retained the
role of advising the Commonwealth on inter-state allocations (CGC 1983).
The principles which governed general purpose allocations of
Commonwealth funds to local governments during the 1970s and early
1980s were also borrowed from the CGC and its experience financing the
States. These emphasised the idea of at least partial fiscal equalisation,
which attempted to compensate for various population, geographic and
other characteristics imposing relative service cost and revenue raising
disabilities on local governments. By the early 1980s, the LGGCs had each
developed a number of disability factors which referred explicitly to the
presence within local government areas of Aboriginal people and discrete
Aboriginal communities. A higher than average Aboriginal population
proportion and the need to provide services to discrete Aboriginal
communities were each seen as legitimate bases for claims from local
governments for an increased proportion of funding from within the
Commonwealth's general purpose local government assistance budget.
In 1984, the Hawke Government commissioned an inquiry into
Commonwealth financial assistance to local government. The terms of
reference for this National Inquiry into Local Government Finance
(NILGF) referred to a review of:
local government tax sharing arrangements ... with reference to: ... the principles
which should determine the level and allocation of the local government
revenue sharing funds between and within States (NILGF 1985: v).
These terms of reference clearly envisaged that the general purpose
revenue sharing nature of this Commonwealth assistance to local
government would remain. Under review were the principles for the
allocation of these funds. In its report, the NILGF strongly endorsed the
principles of fiscal equalisation and, if anything, pushed for their stronger
and less partial application. In the process, the NILGF made a number of
observations, and recommendations about detailed aspects of the revenue
sharing system, including some about the position of Aboriginal people
and communities within that system.
One of the NILGF's observations was that Aboriginal community
organisations in sparsely settled areas of Australia were increasingly being
incorporated as local governments or recognised less formally as local
government-type bodies, but were not generally being included in the
Commonwealth's general purpose local government financial assistance
system. This lead the NILGF to recommend that local governments in
Aboriginal communities and other 'suitably representative (Aboriginal)
community bodies' outside formally incorporated local government areas
'should be eligible' for Commonwealth general purpose local government
financial assistance, with the latter's inclusion being 'subject to agreement
between the Commonwealth and the State government' (NILGF 1985:
337). These recommendations were largely followed in the
Commonwealth's Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1986 and
by 1994 almost 100 new local governments and local government-type
bodies in discrete Aboriginal communities in sparsely settled areas of
Australia had been included in the system; about 60 in the Northern
Territory, 33 in Queensland, five in South Australia and one in Western
Australia (see Sanders 1995: 25-6).
A second of the NILGF's observations was that conventional local
governments throughout Australia did not generally 'cater adequately for
Aboriginals' even though their general purpose grants from the
Commonwealth were 'in part calculated on the basis of Aboriginal
populations residing within their boundaries' (NILGF 1985: 333-4). This
was a reference to the disability factors identifying Aboriginal populations
and communities operating within the various LGGC's fiscal equalisation
methodologies. The NILGF clearly saw it as somewhat ironic that while
general purpose grants to local governments from the Commonwealth were
made in part on the basis of disability factors specifically identifying
Aboriginal populations and communities, the actual level of services to
Aboriginal populations and communities from local governments was
frequently very inadequate. This was not, however, something which the
NILGF could readily change while ever the Commonwealth's system of
local government financing remained one of general purpose revenue
sharing. There was no recommendation in the NILGF report following
from this observation and no subsequent Commonwealth action.
In response to this second NILGF observation, the Western Australian
LGGC in the late 1980s introduced a procedure called the reduced service
requirement, which attempted to disallow a local government from
claiming the presence of disadvantaged Aboriginal people or communities
within its boundaries as a disability if the local government did not then
spend an equitable proportion of the general purpose grants received on
these people or communities. The operation of the procedure was
controversial as it was argued by some to be outside the guidelines for
general revenue sharing set by the Commonwealth's Local Government
(Financial Assistance) Act 1986. After some years of ongoing argument,
the Western Australian LGGC was forced to abandon the procedure in
1992 (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs (HRSCATSIA) 1992: 39).
During its brief reign, the Western Australian LGGC's reduced service
requirement procedure received the attention and endorsement of the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991: 31). Indeed the Royal Commission went on to recommend
more generally:
That the Commonwealth Government negotiate with State and Territory
Governments to ensure that where funds for local government purposes are
supplied to local government authorities on a basis which has regard to the
population of Aboriginal people within the boundaries of a local government
authority equitable distribution of those funds is made between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal residents in those local government areas. The Commission
further recommends that where it is demonstrated that equitable distribution has
not been provided that local government funds should be withheld until it can be
assured that equitable distribution will occur (Commonwealth of Australia
1991: 38-9).
The Commonwealth government's response to this recommendation was
not very positive. Although classified as 'qualified support', in the non-
confrontationist language of the Response by Governments to the Royal
Commission this was close to a clear rejection of the recommendation. The
Commonwealth's response emphasised that 'in recognition that local
government is an elected sphere of government in its own right' these are
'untied' grants for local governments to use 'to meet their own expenditure
priorities'. Later the response also stated that while the 'general point' could
be made that:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are included in the population for
the purposes of calculations, it is not possible to gain a directly proportionate
figure which might appropriately be spent on Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander residents (Commonwealth of Australia 1992: 765-6).
The Royal Commission and the West Australian LGGC were clearly being
rebuffed. The Commonwealth was defending the practice of making untied
general purpose grants to local governments in recognition of their status
as independently-elected democratic spheres of government. The fact that
allocation of these grants was determined through exercises which made
reference to Aborigines in the measurement of disability factors in order to
achieve some degree of fiscal equalisation between local governments was
clearly regarded as of secondary importance to the principle of general
purpose funding.
A third NILGF observation and recommendation was that consideration be
given to an 'untied1, 'formula-based' Commonwealth funding program for
Aboriginal community organisations built on the 'consolidation of existing
special purpose' programs. Such a program, the NILGF argued, could both
ensure 'reasonable stability' of funding 'over a number of years' and also
potentially counter perceptions of arbitrariness in the allocations of existing
funding programs for Aboriginal organisations (NILGF 1985: 336-7). This
recommendation, however, was not followed through either by the
Commonwealth or by local governments, and perhaps most surprisingly
not by Aboriginal organisations. The idea was highly congruent with
emerging ideas about the funding reforms required for Aboriginal self-
government, but it was not an aspect of the NILGF's observations and
recommendations which Aboriginal organisations took up.
Encounter II: the CGC and State/Territory financing
During the 1990s, a similar, but perhaps more concerted encounter
between Aboriginal organisations and Australian fiscal federalism has
begun to emerge over Commonwealth financing of the States and
Territories. This encounter began during 1992 when the CGC was
undertaking one of its regular reviews of the relativities governing the
allocation of Commonwealth general purpose funds between the States and
Territories. The less populous States had for many years successfully used
these CGC deliberations to argue for a greater than per capita share of
Commonwealth general purpose funding on the basis of their relative
service provision and revenue raising disabilities (May 1971). During the
1980s, the newly self-governing and even less populous Northern Territory
had enthusiastically joined this fray and had quickly won for itself the
highest relativity of all. The Northern Territory received over five times the
level of Commonwealth general purpose revenue sharing that it would
have on a per capita basis and was, as a consequence, dependent for up to
80 per cent of its budget on Commonwealth funding.'
During the 1970s and 1980s, Aboriginal organisations had not taken a
great interest in CGC deliberations. However, in 1992 the Northern and
Central Land Councils in the Northern Territory clearly decided that they
should and so too, to a lesser extent, did the national-level Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).2 The Northern and Central
Land Councils had by that time become highly distrustful of the Northern
Territory Government, largely through their dealings over the previous
decade in relation to land for Aboriginal people. They now perceived that
while the Northern Territory Government argued enthusiastically before
the CGC about major revenue raising and service delivery disabilities
which it faced as a result of the Territory's proportionately large and
geographically dispersed Aboriginal population, it did not, in the Land
Councils' view, provide adequate or appropriate services to this Aboriginal
population. The Land Councils suggested to the CGC that Aboriginal
organisations, possibly as local or regional self-governing bodies, should
be funded directly to deliver these services, rather than the Northern
Territory Government. They also suggested that, as a prelude to this,
conditions relating to these underlying calculations of disabilities be placed
on the Northern Territory Government's receipt of general purpose funds
(CGC 1992; Crough 1992).
The CGC devoted a chapter of its 1993 grant relativities review
specifically to the issues of 'Funding for Aboriginals and Torres Strait
Islanders'. It. argued that much of what was being proposed to it by the
Land Councils fell 'outside the responsibility of the Commission'. Under its
'fiscal equalisation' charter, the CGC argued, it had no role to play in
auditing the expenditures of State or Territory Governments to ensure that
funding was 'directed to particular areas of assessed need' (CGC 1993: 63-
4). Nor did it have any role to play in relation to the proposal:
That untied funding to the Northern Territory for provision of essential services
to remote Aboriginal communities be provided in future direct to Aboriginal
local governing bodies (CGC 1993: 67).
These, the CGC argued, were matters 'for governments to consider', not the
CGC. However, the CGC did acknowledge that 'if taken up by
governments', these proposals would have 'important implications for the
present system of general revenue grants' (CGC 1993: 63-7).
Two years on from these CGC comments, debates on these matters appear
not to have progressed. Two recent submissions to the Commonwealth
government on proposed social justice measures for indigenous
Australians, one from the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and the
other from ATSIC, have once again canvassed these issues (Council for
Aboriginal Reconciliation 1995: 66-9; ATSIC 1995: 75-84). Each has
described the process of general purpose Commonwealth revenue sharing
with the States and Territories and the CGC's use of disability factors
relating to Aboriginal people within that process. Each then went on to
recommend both that conditions be placed on general purpose grants
relating to these disability factors and that consideration be given to greater
use of direct funding of Aboriginal organisations.
Although a response to these social justice submissions has yet to be made,
it will, in my view, be virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to
respond positively to the call for the placing of conditions on general
purpose grants allocated on the advice of the CGC. This judgement is
based on a broader understanding of Australian fiscal federalism and the
place within it of untied grants and grants commission exercises.
Analysis I: grants commissions, grant conditions and the universe of
Australian fiscal federalism
The general purpose grants flowing from the Commonwealth to State,
Territory and local governments as a result of the CGC's and LGGCs'
exercises are only one half of Australian fiscal federalism. The other half is
a multiplicity of specific purpose payments flowing between government
agencies operating at different levels of government in similar policy areas
(Auditor-General 1995). It is these latter payments which have
traditionally, in Australian fiscal federalism, had conditions attached, while
the general purpose grants have remained untied.
This system of fiscal transfers has, in many ways, been built on the
expectation of the States that they will receive a large proportion of their
funds from the Commonwealth as untied general purpose grants. They
regard the arrangement as an appropriate recognition of their status as
sovereign independent elected levels of government and, in many ways, as
a right. The States would clearly very strongly resist any attempt to place
conditions on their general purpose grants.
Where the Commonwealth has sought to impose conditions on payments to
the State, Territories and local governments, it has generally done so by
building up specific purpose payments outside of grants commission
exercises. It has done this to a very significant degree over the years.
Specific purpose payments have risen from around 20 per cent of
Commonwealth money flowing to the States in the early post-war years to
slightly over 50 per cent in recent years (Groenewegen 1994; Sharman
1995). However, the other almost 50 per cent of intergovernmental fiscal
transfers flowing from the Commonwealth to the States and Territories,
some $15 billion in 1993-94, remains in the form of general purpose
revenue sharing allocated on the advice of the CGC in line with the
principle of 'fiscal equalisation' and without conditions attached.3 The
States and Territories regard this arrangement as extremely important and
in 1994 negotiated with the Commonwealth for it not to further reduce
general purpose allocations in real terms over a three-year period (Willis
1995).
Whether this degree of attachment by the States and Territories to the
unconditional nature of general purpose grants distributed on the advice of
the CGC is fully understood by the Aboriginal organisations pushing for
self-government is not entirely clear. The Aboriginal organisations appear
to have made the placing of conditions on these grants one of their central
tactics and the CGC a central institutional target. However, in many ways,
neither these conditions nor the CGC are central to the push for self-
government reform. What the reformers ultimately want is a new deal for
Aboriginal community organisations, both in relation to funding and
jurisdictional service responsibilities. As the CGC has repeatedly pointed
out, these are matters to be taken up with governments directly, rather than
with the CGC (CGC 1993: 63-8; Searle 1994). Focussing on the CGC and
the Aboriginal-related disability factors in its fiscal equalisation
methodology may embarrass Commonwealth, State and Territory
governments slightly, but it will not greatly advance negotiations with
them over a new deal in relation to funding and jurisdictional service
responsibilities for Aboriginal organisations.
Analysis II: tactics relating to specific purpose payments
Rather than asking for conditions to be placed on the general purpose
payments made to the States and Territories on the advice of the COC, the
Aboriginal organisations could perhaps more fruitfully be asking for more
extensive use in fiscal federal relations of specific purpose payments
relating to services to Aboriginal people. This could take the form either of
more extensive use of conditions relating to services to Aboriginal people
in existing specific purpose payments or the shifting of money from
general purpose payments to specific purpose payments in Aboriginal
service areas. Although both these tactics may meet with some State and
Territory government resistance, such resistance would be mild in
comparison to that encountered in a bid to impose conditions on general
purpose payments.
ATSIC appears aware of these possibilities for the use of specific purpose
payments. In its recent submission to the Commonwealth government on
proposed social justice measures for indigenous Australians it
recommended that:
The Commonwealth Government ensure that all Specific Purpose Payment
(SPP) arrangements which have the potential to affect service delivery to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples include conditions specifically
aimed at ensuring that indigenous people have full access to and equitable
treatment in, programs funded under those arrangements (ATSIC 1995: 83).
It also recommended that:
The determination of recurrent expenditure requirements of the States and
Territories in respect of Aboriginal Community Services should be based on an
independent assessment of community needs and excluded from the
Commonwealth Grants Commission assessments for the purposes of General
Revenue Grants to the States/Territories and
a. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Services be funded by
Specific Purpose Payments; and
b. an additional category of Specific Purpose Payments be established for
funding of capital works (ATSIC 1995: 83-4).
However, Aboriginal organisations outside ATSIC interested in self-
government appear to have been less enamoured with such tactics relating
to specific purpose payments.
One reason why Aboriginal organisations interested in self-government
may have failed to develop tactics involving specific purpose payments is
that better use of these payments to the States and Territories would in
many ways only represent an intermediate step towards their more
fundamental goal of winning new funding arrangements and jurisdictional
servicing responsibilities for Aboriginal organisations. The organisations
are, ultimately, somewhat opposed to the idea of State and Territory
agencies, rather than Aboriginal organisations, delivering services to
Aboriginal people and thus perhaps not greatly interested in the
Commonwealth using special purpose payments to induce better service
delivery by the States and Territories. However, this intermediate nature of
the tactic is also the case with the placing of conditions on general purpose
payments which, as noted above, the Aboriginal organisations pushing for
self-government have taken up with some enthusiasm.
Analysis III: a surprising omission
Another tactic which the Aboriginal organisations interested in self-
government have curiously not taken up with great enthusiasm, is to push
for a general purpose revenue sharing arrangement with the
Commonwealth for Aboriginal organisations. Although there has been
some talk of 'block grants' among Aboriginal organisations in recent years,
this has not been developed into any concerted push for a general purpose
revenue sharing program of their own. This is a surprising omission, as it
would clearly be the most direct route towards ideas of Aboriginal self-
government within Australian fiscal federalism and there have been both
suggestions and opportunities for the development of such a program.
One suggestion and opportunity mentioned above, was the NILGF's
recommendation in 1985 that consideration be given to establishing an
'untied', 'formula-based' funding program for Aboriginal organisations
through the 'consolidation1 of existing specific purpose programs. However
this was not taken up. Another opportunity presented itself from 1990, with
the re-organisation of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal affairs portfolio into
ATSIC. In 1993, one former longstanding COC member reiterated the
potential for such a general purpose formula-based funding approach
focusing on ATSIC moneys as the basis for Aboriginal self-government
(Matthews 1993: 9). The CGC itself has also noted that if such an approach
were adopted, it may have some expertise to offer on issues of equalisation
between Aboriginal community organisations, if an appropriate reference
to it from government was forthcoming (CGC 1993: 67). However, these
opportunities and offers have largely failed to be taken up by Aboriginal
organisations interested in self-government and the issue has not greatly
progressed.
Analysis IV: a potential inconsistency?
If Aboriginal organisations interested in self-government reform were ever
to take up the push for a general purpose, formula-based funding program
of their own in a more concerted fashion, they would, however, find
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themselves in a rather difficult tactical position. On the one hand, they
would be advocating an untied general revenue sharing approach in
relation to themselves, as recognition of their status as self-governing
entities, while at the same time advocating the imposition of conditions on
general purpose revenue sharing grants to existing State, Territory and
local governments within the Australian federal system. This inconsistency
would be something of a liability for the Aboriginal organisations. It would
seem difficult to be arguing for one's own general purpose revenue sharing
arrangement, in recognition of being a tier of government, while at the
same time condemning the general purpose revenue sharing arrangements
of other tiers of government.
The way out of this inconsistency for Aboriginal organisations may be to
reassess their tactical approach to general purpose revenue sharing
arrangements with the States, Territories and local governments. Rather
than asking for conditions to be placed on these because of underlying
disability factor calculations relating to Aborigines involved in fiscal
equalisation exercises, Aboriginal organisations could perhaps champion
the general purpose nature of these arrangements as clear precedents for
their own desired general purpose arrangement. This would clearly involve
some major rethinking of the tactics and targets currently being pursued by
Aboriginal organisations interested in self-government reforms.
Conclusion
The above analysis would seem to suggest that there has been some lack of
clarity among Aboriginal organisations interested in self-government
reforms in recent years over precisely what they are trying to achieve,
through which mechanisms of Australian fiscal federalism and how they
are trying to achieve it. The COC and its methodology of fiscal
equalisation appear to have been given inordinate attention, while other
potential tactics and targets have remained undeveloped. An attempt to
have conditions placed on general purpose revenue sharing with the States,
Territories and local government, as a prelude to more direct funding of
Aboriginal organisation, has distracted attention from more fundamental
self-government goals. It has also meant that there would be a potential
inconsistency in the self-government argument of the Aboriginal
organisations, were they ever to focus more concertedly on the
development of a general purpose revenue sharing arrangement of their
own with the Commonwealth. The tactics and targets of Aboriginal
organisations interested in working towards self-government through
various mechanisms of Australian fiscal federalism do, I would argue, need
some significant rethinking.
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Notes
1. State levels of dependence on Commonwealth funding are around 50 per cent.
2. The Northern and Central Land Councils are statutory bodies established under
the Commonwealth's Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. In
addition to their land roles, they have become important regional political
organisations for Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory and have even been
termed 'paragovernmental' by some commentators (Altman and Dillon 1988).
ATSIC is a national elected representative body for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people statutorily established by the Commonwealth in 1989. It also
administers a range of Commonwealth programs for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people.
3. The $15 billion figure is from Willis and Beazley (1994). This also gives a figure
for specific purpose payments for the year at $17 billion, so the percentage split
for 1993-94 was around 47:53.
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